- October 6, 2025
The ending of life unworthy of life: could we go there again?
Earlier this year I went to a presentation led by a team from the School of Health Care at my university entitled Finding Ivy: a life worthy of life. The topic was a project that identified and gave details of 13 victims of the Nazi Aktion T-4 programme who were unusual in having been born in the United Kingdom. It was named for a young woman Ivy Angerer who had a learning disability and who was murdered, during the initial formal stage of the programme, along with an estimated 70-80,000 other people with learning disabilities, chronic mental illness or epilepsy as part of a mass killing campaign aimed at emptying the asylums of people with what was called life unworthy of life.

Aktion T-4, described in some detail in Michael Burleigh’s book Death and Deliverance, unfortunately out of print, is now little talked about. The Finding Ivy research project and presentation and the exhibition accompanying it brought the detail distressingly to life by putting real names and real people to the otherwise rather anonymous factual accounts of the matter. There is value in memorialising in the lives and deaths of people otherwise treated as worthless – both for their family’s sake and because it reminds us of an essential human value. At the same time the project raised some interesting and important questions.
What was the relation between the murderous Aktion T-4 campaign and the campaign that involved compulsory sterilisation of people with learning disabilities and mental illness?
What was the relation between the Aktion T-4 campaign and the much larger scale murder of Jews and other groups in the Holocaust? Does any of this have relevance to modern society, either now or for the direction in which society is travelling?
In the first part of the 20th century sterilisation campaigns were not uncommon in other countries besides Germany – the motivation coming apparently from eugenic theory. There were links also to ideas about degeneracy so that mental illness, epilepsy and intellectual disability could be seen as part of a cluster of genetically determined conditions. Sterilisation was therefore a way of improving the population gene pool.
But other sterilisation programmes did not go on to campaigns aimed at killing members of the same groups. Eugenics could not be evoked as a rationale for this development – the victims were already in institutional surroundings that made reproduction impossible so there was no genetic advantage to the killing. Instead, the argument was mainly economic; the occupants of the asylums were so-called ballast existence or useless eaters. They were drains on more worthwhile members of society – a line of thinking that was most infamously introduced in Binding and Hoche’s 1920 Allowing the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life. The callousness that made murder possible came perhaps from a certain indifference to violent death brought about by the experience of the Great War.

Although these two rationales feature strongly in arguments of the time and indeed since (see for example Dagmar Herzog’s recent The Question of Unworthy Life) there were other more emotional appeals at play. As well as looking on a group of people as unworthy of life for genetic or economic reasons, they could be presented as people who might themselves welcome release from an awful existence: expressions of revulsion or disgust were not uncommon.

What about the link of Aktion T-4 to the wider Holocaust? Was there an ideological connection or was it more accidental, simply that Aktion T-4 generated a technology that could be used for a completely different purpose? Insistence on the uniqueness of the Holocaust makes it difficult to see or explore links between mass murder (particularly of Jews) and other forms of institutionalised murder, but such links may be there nonetheless.
One pointer resides in the theoretical underpinnings of the national movement that placed those living lives unworthy of life as something more than simply an economic or social problem. They were now, like other enemies of the racial state, a profound existential threat to be answered by an increasing drift from consensus to coercion based upon a preoccupation with racial purity and the fulfilment of a quasi-religious destiny. The mobilising passions of Robert Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism.
So there is a common theme in the expansion of choice of victim – all were seen as enemies within: those who could poison the genetic pool; economic parasites; those were different and undermining beliefs and practices (Jews, Roma, homosexuals, communists…). A slightly different way of looking at it is to see the motivation as primarily racist. So-called race hatred (Rassenhaß) is directed at those outside the Volk (Jews, Roma, Blacks etc) while race anxiety (Rassenangst) is directed at those who belong to the Volk but who nonetheless threaten its existence by virtue of some unacceptable pathology (idiots, epileptics, homosexuals etc).
What about the present? Societal attitudes have changed in many ways since the 1940s, but some socially accepted practices may carry the same message today about lives not worth living. The discussion about Finding Ivy, and an associated journal article, have suggested a number of such practices: prenatal screening for Down syndrome with the expectation of termination of pregnancy if screening tests are positive; poor quality healthcare that is leading to people with learning disabilities dying up to 20 years earlier than the average; use of Do Not Attempt Resuscitation notices and delayed prioritisation of vaccination during the recent Covid pandemic all suggest a persistence of ideas about lives that are less valued than others.
A weakness of leaving it there is the non-specific nature of the attribution of “negative attitudes” to people with a learning disability. In aiming to being more specific, I think one clue lies in the rise in recent times of fraught debates about gender, neurodiversity and ethnicity. The vehement politics of identity nod at what has been called “..a sense of overwhelming crisis and victimhood, a fear of the decline of one’s group, a lust for purity and authority…”.
Another example. I went to the Finding Ivy presentation the day before parliament held the third reading and voted to approve Kim Leadbeater’s Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. Its aim is to give some people with life limiting illnesses the option of a medically-assisted suicide. Those with learning disabilities are in the frame – with proxy signatories and advocates available to ensure they get full access, and no hint that the Bill’s sponsors understand the risks. But there is a more fundamental point here. The lobby group Dignity in Dying says that these assisted suicides are not about shortening life but about shortening death. So the Bill does not require any exploration at all of why somebody might be asking for help in ending their life – it is simply taken as self-evident that they are leading (to put it bluntly) a sort of un-life, with no value lost from ending it.
This disdain for the un-life comes with an incongruous insistence on the central principle of the Bill being choice, autonomy and the importance of dignity. This is the dignity that is a characteristic of individuals – not innate but made by how they live and die, the latter by suicide, if desired. What PM Keir Starmer, a promoter of the Bill calls “Human dignity. The dignity of the individual. And the respect that goes with it.” The link to the past is the idea of some sort of perfect individual – autonomous, dignified, the ideal citizen – but one who is likely to be undervalued, their wishes ignored, under threat from influences outside their control.
Even if we accept that there are similar psychological forces at play now as there were in inter-war Germany, there is clearly something radically different about where we are compared to the authoritarian or fascist regimes of that time. We lack the prevailing socio-political circumstances that might allow the emergence of a much more virulent form of discrimination. To get there we need two things. One is something equivalent to the extreme economic depressions of the interwar years. For this we can look to climate change and mass migration – even if they are to have their major effects in Western Europe. The other is a genuinely charismatic and effective leader of the extreme right who can exploit the resulting unease. In her recent review of world politics and the threat they pose, Fascism a Warning, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright suggested that the rise of such a leader was facilitated by weak and unpopular social democratic alternatives and a degree of complicity with less extremist but nonetheless right wing political groups. Sounds familiar even if, again, we aren’t there yet in the UK .
So, I don’t want to pretend that we are anywhere near Aktion T-4, but neither do I want to pretend that such a thing is unimaginable. In his 1966 radio talk and essay Education After Auschwitz, Theodor Adorno asked how we could avoid a return to the barbarism of the holocaust. He concentrated on the psychological not because he thought social and political factors were unimportant but because he thought the former were more amenable to intervention. He argued for a sustained programme so that “education and enlightenment can still manage a little something”. Perhaps we could hope to see it start on the 60th anniversary of his talk.









