• August 9, 2024

A Reader’s Guide: Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults Bill [HL]

It is 10 years since Charlie Falconer introduced his previous assisted dying Bill in the House of Lords. Plenty of time then to work on the detail of his new Bill and make sure it avoids the vagueness and sense of evasiveness that characterises the McArthur Bill currently under consideration in Scotland. Here I review Falconer’s Bill and try to answer the questions outlined in a previous blog on what exactly it is that assisted dying campaigners want.

Q1: What exactly is the practice to be legalised?

The aim of the Bill (Section 1) is to make lawful the provision to terminally ill adults (aged 18 or older) of assistance to end their own lives. Section 4 goes into more detail. A suitably qualified medical practitioner prescribes drugs expected to be fatal when taken and an assisting medical professional (who may be a different doctor or a nurse) prepares those drugs for use. The assisting medical professional may “prepare a medical device which will enable that person to self-administer the medicine, and assist that person to ingest or otherwise self-administer the medicine”. The decision to self-administer the medicine and the final act of doing so must be taken by the person for whom the medicine has been prescribed. There is no definition of either the nature of allowed assistance or the minimum requirement for the final act to be defined as self-administration.

The nature of the medical device and the final act are unspecified but as written the Bill is compatible with insertion of a naso-gastric or PEG-feeding tube as might happen if a patient were being provided with supplementary feeding, or setting up an intravenous infusion as for providing parenteral nutrition. In which case the final act means no more than working the on-off switch. When this latter sort of arrangement is used to provide post-operative pain relief it is called patient-controlled analgesia (PCA for short). What Falconer’s Bill proposes is to legalise either physician assisted suicide or patient-controlled euthanasia, the decision to be decided by the parties involved at the time.

Section 4.4 of Falconer’s Bill: an unusual definition of self-administration?

As with the McArthur Bill an additional requirement (Section 4.6) is that whichever practitioner provides the approved substances must remain in close proximity to the adult (but not necessarily in the same room) until they change their mind or if they accept the approved substances, until they die.  The Bill offers no explanation for this requirement but the reason is likely to be that the health practitioner is required to be on hand to manage problems. There is no indication in the Bill of what attending clinicians are expected or allowed to do in the event of distressing complications or long-delayed death. 

A substantial component of the “assistance” allowed under the Bill is therefore simply not defined – apparently to be decided later by the Secretary of State.

Q2: Who exactly will be eligible?

The definition of terminal illness (Section 2) that describes who is eligible for assistance describes an illness that is progressive, cannot be reversed by treatment and can “reasonably be expected” to lead to death within 6 months. Nobody doubts that the reasonable expectation will be wrong in a fair proportion of cases (10% or more from Oregon experience).

There is no requirement for intolerable symptoms or suffering. Section 2.2 says “Treatment which only relieves the symptoms of an inevitably progressive condition temporarily is not to be regarded as treatment which can reverse that condition.” This is a little ambiguous but is saying, I think, that a person who has no symptoms with or without treatment is still eligible.

Q3 What safeguards (clinical and social) will be in place?

There are certain requirements to be met in a clinical assessment (Section 3): two independent doctors must examine the person and the person’s medical records.  Presumably this means “such medical records as they can get hold of”: electronic health records for primary care, secondary physical health care and mental health care are frequently not linked and written case records are frequently untraceable. There is no defined minimum acceptable review of records.

From these sources and “in-depth discussions with the person” the two doctors must independently establish the presence of terminal illness as defined in the Bill, the presence of mental capacity as usually defined legally, and absence of undue influence coercion or duress. Mental health is only considered to the degree to which it impairs mental capacity. No detailed attention is given to the complex business of how to identify coercion (the Crown Prosecution Service website offers 32 pointers towards the presence of a controlling or coercive relationship and points out that the list is not exhaustive.)

The main direct risk in assisted dying legislation resides, however, not in mental incapacity or coercion but in the risk it poses to people who see no other choices – maybe living alone and lacking social or emotional support, physically restricted, financially insecure, with a history of mental health or alcohol problems. These are the risks for suicide associated with physical illness and they would be the focus of any careful assessment of a person encountered in clinical practice who said they wanted to end their life. It hardly needs saying that they do not resemble in any way the features of the self-confident, articulate and well-connected celebrities fielded by campaigners and the media in support of assisted dying legislation.

Given these risks, the assessment process looks thin. There is no requirement to explore social or psychological factors such as those routinely explored in other settings when somebody has thoughts that life is not worth living – for example the ambivalence or sense of helplessness or hopelessness that might accompany such thoughts – or to know anything about the individual’s personal background or social circumstances. There is no requirement to know about previous mental health problems or, for example, previous episodes of self-harm or attempted suicide. Neither is there a requirement to contact or discuss the case with the person’s usual medical practitioner or other clinician who knows the person or to examine the person’s medical records. There is no requirement to contact the person’s next of kin or any other informant.

Q4 What legal safeguards will be in place?

The gaps in the Bill may be filled (Section 4.7 and 4.9, Section 8) by guidance and Codes of Practice written by The Secretary of State – I couldn’t find a note of which one. The regulations and codes of practice must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. Failure to follow any Code of Practice will not in itself render a person liable to criminal or civil proceedings.

Any regulations presented by the Secretary of State must “provide for the cause of death to be recorded as ‘assisted death’”. At least here is an advance on McArthur’s Bill.

Q5 How will adverse events be monitored and responded to?

The relevant Chief Medical Office must “monitor the operation of the Act including compliance with its provisions and any regulations or code of practice made under it” and present an annual report (Section 9). Since so little is specified, that seems to boil down to making sure the bureaucratic procedures are followed. The CMO’s report must specify the numbers of requests rejected but the Bill doesn’t say why – presumably to keep an eye on undue reticence in processing applications. There is no indication of what if any mandatory data collection will be required – for example there is no mandated recording or reporting of protocol violations or adverse events.

Standardised definitions and reporting of adverse events: routine in clinical trials; non-existent in assisted dying legislation.

A 5-year review of the operation of the Act (Section 13) will report (a bit of a give-away here) “the extent to which the Act has been successful in supporting terminally ill adults in being lawfully provided with assistance to end their own lives” and to report “any concerns with the operation of the Act which have been raised”. However, since there is no mandatory requirement to ascertain or report protocol violations or adverse events in the CMO’s annual reports and there is no requirement to obtain formal public feedback on the operation of the Act it is difficult to know what “concerns” might be reported. There is no indication of the criteria against which concerns will be judged and unsurprisingly therefore there are no stopping rules even hinted at. There is no research project in which I have been involved that would have been approved and funded on the basis of this level of (lack of) scrutiny of risks.

The Bill is brief – nine pages and one appended schedule – and missing much detail. As with McArthur’s Bill there are numerous gaps in the account of what is proposed and what practices are excluded, safeguards for the vulnerable are minimal and serious monitoring of risks and adverse events is bordering on non-existent.  It is difficult to read it as other than foot-in-the door legislation for an eventual Euthanasia Bill.

Source: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3741

  • August 5, 2024

A Reader’s Guide: Liam McArthur’s Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill

Anybody who has been following the campaign for assisted dying legislation will not be surprised that Liam McArthur’s Bill lacks detail and leaves several important questions unanswered. Here I review the Bill and try to answer the questions outlined in a previous blog on what exactly it is that assisted dying campaigners want.

Q1: What exactly is the practice to be legalised?

The aim of the Bill (Section 1) is to make lawful the provision to terminally ill adults (aged 16 or older) of assistance to end their own lives. Only on Page 8 Section 15 does it say what “assistance” might mean: a coordinating registered medical practitioner can “provide a terminally ill adult with an ‘approved substance’ with which the adult may end their own life.”  And it is only in the accompanying explanatory notes (paragraph 42) that it is noted “The person must self-administer the substance.” 

This sounds like assisted suicide but the two key terms here are “provide” and “self-administer”. Neither is further defined. Can a doctor “provide” an approved substance by inserting a naso-gastric or PEG-feeding tube as might happen if a patient were being provided with supplementary feeding? Or set up an intravenous infusion as they might if providing parenteral nutrition? In which case “self-administer” might mean no more than working the on-off switch. When this latter sort of arrangement is used to provide post-operative pain relief it is called patient-controlled analgesia (PCA for short). When used to end life it sounds less like physician assisted suicide and more like patient-controlled euthanasia. There is no mention of what self-administration would entail in other situations – for example when somebody is so physically impaired that they require a proxy to sign the declarations that set the process in motion.

There is a further problem with lack of specificity. An additional requirement (Section 15) is that whichever practitioner provides the approved substances must remain with the adult, at least in the same building, until they change their mind or if they accept the approved substances, until they die.  The Bill offers no explanation for this requirement but the reason is likely to be that the health practitioner is required to be on hand to manage problems. There is no indication in the Bill of what attending clinicians in Scotland are expected or allowed to do in the event of distressing complications or long-delayed death.  A substantial component of the “assistance” allowed under the Bill is therefore simply not defined.

Q2: Who exactly will be eligible?

The three-line definition (Section 2) of who is eligible for assistance refers only to terminal illness with no mention of symptoms or unendurable suffering.

Despite the use of “terminal illness” to describe the main eligibility criterion there is no mention of the likelihood of imminent death In Section 2 or elsewhere in the Bill. The defining features of terminal illness in the Bill are that it can reasonably be expected to cause the adult’s premature death, that it is advanced and progressive and that it is a condition from which the adult is “unable to recover”. These sound like substantial constraining criteria but they are not. Most people imagine that “terminal illness” is synonymous with “about to die” but “advanced” has no standardised definition and is not defined further in the Bill or the explanatory notes. The definition, far from referring only to a small number of people in their last days or weeks, covers large numbers of the population. From the accompanying policy memorandum (Paragraph 44), there is explicitly no time scale according to which the whole process is required to unfold.

Q3 What safeguards (clinical and social) will be in place?

Much of the appeal to support “assisted dying” is built around the idea that it is the individual’s right to exercise their personal preference (choice). It is the basis for McArthur’s interest: the policy memorandum accompanying the Bill mentions (Paragraph 4) only his belief that “an individual’s personal autonomy to decide…how their life should end in situations of terminal illness, should be protected in law…”.

Just some of the pointers to the presence of a coercive relationship listed on the CPS website (link in text)

This approach comes with a particular and very limited view of the assessment that has to be undertaken prior to provision of approved substances (Sections 3-7). Apart from certain bureaucratic requirements – proof of identity, age 16+ years, residence in Scotland for at least 12 months, registration with a medical practice in Scotland –  the only medical or other requirements are the presence of terminal illness as defined in the Bill, presence of mental capacity as usually defined legally, and absence of coercion by others. Mental health is only considered to the degree to which it impairs mental capacity. No detailed attention is given to the complex business of how to identify coercion (the Crown Prosecution Service website offers 32 pointers towards the presence of a controlling or coercive relationship and points out that the list is not exhaustive.)

The main direct risk in assisted dying legislation resides, however, not in these usually floated ideas about mental incapacity or coercion but in the risk it poses to people who see no other choices – maybe living alone and lacking social or emotional support, physically restricted, financially insecure, with a history of mental health or alcohol problems. These are the risks for suicide associated with physical illness and they would be the focus of any careful assessment of a person encountered in clinical practice who said they wanted to end their life. It hardly needs saying that they do not resemble in any way the features of the self-confident, articulate and well-connected celebrities fielded by campaigners and the media in support of assisted dying legislation.

Given these risks, the assessment process looks dismayingly thin. There is no requirement to explore social or psychological factors such as those routinely explored in other settings when somebody has thoughts that life is not worth living – for example the ambivalence or sense of helplessness or hopelessness that might accompany such thoughts – or to know anything about the individual’s personal background or social circumstances. There is no requirement to know about previous mental health problems or, for example, previous episodes of self-harm or attempted suicide. Neither is there a requirement to contact and discuss the case with the person’s usual medical practitioner or other clinician who knows the person or to examine the person’s medical records. There is no requirement to contact  the person’s next of kin (even for a 16 year old) or any other informant – not even the person who witnesses the “declaration” of desire for assisted suicide or euthanasia.

Q4 What legal safeguards will be in place?

The gaps in the Bill – and there are many – will be filled by guidance written by Scottish Ministers (Section 23) who are required only to consult such persons as they think appropriate.  The guidance does not have to be presented to parliament for approval.

One of the safeguards against misapplication of important powers is the possibility of legal action brought by those who have been directly or indirectly affected, un-consulted family members for example. The Bill anticipates that and makes provision (Section 20 subsection 1) that providing lawful assistance (in the Bill’s terms) to assisted suicide does not give rise to any civil liability, and in subsection (2)  that “Subsection (1) does not limit the circumstances in which a court can otherwise find that a person who has assisted another person to end their own life is not subject to civil liability.”

The most shocking part of the McArthur Bill is the proposal that a misleading death certificate should be issued. Section 17 subsection 2 says “…the terminal illness involved is to be recorded as the disease or condition directly leading to death (rather than the approved substance provided to them by virtue of section 15)”. It is difficult to reconcile this provision with the claim (Policy Memorandum paragraph 58) that “…the Member wishes assisted dying to be a transparent, accountable process…”.

Liam McArthur makes the choice to sign up to support his own Bill

There is a longer-term legal question that is mentioned only tangentially. McArthur’s Bill is presented in a libertarian framework of autonomy and the right to personal choice and in the policy memorandum (Paragraphs 96-100) it is argued that notwithstanding the ECHR’s lack of enthusiasm for the idea “the Bill proposed would enhance a person’s human rights”. This rights-based argument has been used in other jurisdictions to extend the initial remit of assisted dying legislation on the basis that it is discriminatory not to do so. In Paragraph 28 of the Policy Memorandum we are told that the Bill has more in common with legislation such as that in Oregon than it does with legislation such as that in Belgium and the Netherlands, without even a nod at the history of legislation in those countries (and Canada) where an initially restricted eligibility has been rapidly expanded in the name of rights and equity.

Q5 How will adverse events be monitored and responded to?

The Bill describes a rather circular process in which the Scottish Ministers provide information to Public Health Scotland (Section 25) which PHS then uses to prepare its annual report to the Scottish Ministers (Section 24).  The annual report is then used as the basis for an annual report presented to parliament (Section 26) and after 5 years these reports form the basis of a review of the operation of the Act (Section 27).

These various reports are apparently to be based upon information collected via Schedule 4 appended to the Bill. They are largely bureaucratic, including little more than some basic demographic information, reason for the request, the substances used (but not their method of administration) and the place of death. Although “time between use of approved substance and death” is to be recorded in Schedule 4 it is not listed as being included in the annual reports. Indeed there is no information to be reported on adverse events such a symptoms, delayed death or regaining consciousness.

The 5-year review of the operation of the Act will include (Section 27.2.b) a note of “any concerns with the operation of the Act which have been noted”. However there is no mandatory requirement to ascertain or report protocol violations or adverse events in the annual reports and there is no requirement to obtain formal public feedback on the operation of the Act. It is difficult to know, therefore, what “concerns” might be reported and by whom. There is no indication of the criteria against which concerns will be judged and unsurprisingly therefore there are no stopping rules even hinted at – so no indication of what “concerns” would be sufficient to curtail or stop the programme. What’s an unacceptable error rate for a project the end point of which is the death of its participants?

Reading McArthur’s Bill is not reassuring for anybody worried about the risks that are posed by legislation aimed at legalising assisted suicide or euthanasia. There are numerous gaps in the account of what is proposed, safeguards for the vulnerable are minimal, and monitoring amounts to little more than head counting.

Source: The Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill and the papers associated with it, including explanatory notes and policy memorandum are available online at: https://www.parliament.scot/bills-and-laws/bills/assisted-dying-for-terminally-ill-adults-scotland-bill/introduced  accessed 4 August 2024

  • August 1, 2024

Assisted Dying – the more people know the less they like it

If you are being asked to consent to an operation you aren’t asked a single question: “Do you want an operation, yes or no?” It is explained to you what exactly the procedure is and what its likely benefits and possible risks are. And yet claims about massive public support for “assisted dying” are based on exactly that – a single question.

The situation is made worse by persistent evasiveness about exactly what it is that campaigners want legalised – right down to the practice of claiming it isn’t assisted suicide even while campaigning to have assisting suicide decriminalised. As a result of this evasiveness a 2021 poll conducted for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Dying Well found that only 43% of people knew that “assisted dying” was the same thing as assisted suicide, with many thinking it referred to a right to refuse active treatment (already legal) or that it was a synonym for palliative care.

A 2014 poll conducted by ComRes for the campaigning organisation CNK made clear the reasons for this vagueness – the more people know about assisted dying the less they like it. While 73% of respondents initially said they agreed with changing the law, when presented with some practical considerations in making the decision that approval rate fell to 43%.

Here are five questions every supporter of assisted dying should answer in detail before any support for their plans could be regarded as fully informed:

Q1: What exactly is the practice you want to see legalised?

A survey for Living and Dying Well published in July 2024 found that when the details of assisted dying were defined, the majority of respondents were not in favour of a change in the law. So clarity without euphemism is needed. The answer to this question must be either assisted suicide or euthanasia.  Most people imagine, when they have some notion of what assisted dying is, that a doctor will provide drugs that the individual then swallows – as in a typical suicidal overdose.  However both Liam McArthur’s Scotland bill and Lord Falconer’s bill of this year are compatible with a doctor establishing an intravenous infusion which the individual then starts running (with physical help if necessary). In other words a sort of patient controlled euthanasia. Going beyond the names –

Which drugs and what method of administration (oral or intravenous) are to be legalised?

A part of this question is:

What practice will be legal in the event of problems arising during the assisted death?

Supportive accounts invariably avoid the reality of how common problems are and good data are hard to come by: the best available review suggests – retching for hours (up to 10%), death delayed for hours or even days (up to 7%) and recovery of consciousness (up to 4%). What additional interventions can be made if these problems occur? In Canada, clinicians can administer additional lethal drugs “to complete the process”. Is that part of proposed legislation?

Jack Kevorkian and his suicide machine

Q2: Who exactly will be eligible?

Each of the common reasons given for assisted dying has its problems. Imminent death is difficult to predict except in the last days or weeks of life, and death may be months or years after somebody is deemed “terminally ill”. Life-limiting and incurable illness is extremely common and raises a spectre of use far beyond what was originally envisaged (7% of all deaths in Quebec are now by lethal injection).  Intractable suffering is the banner under which euthanasia or assisted suicide have been introduced for mental illness, a widely opposed indication among the general public.

An example of the importance of being clear and specific about eligible groups is Liam McArthur’s assisted dying bill in Scotland which is described as being about people with terminal illness but is in fact about people with life-limiting and incurable illness. One way into this question is to ask:

Are examples specified of conditions other than advanced cancer that will be included and any that will be excluded?

Q3 What safeguards (clinical and social) will be in place?

The privileging of personal choice is a feature of much of the support for assisted dying.  Assessment then comes to be focused on factors that might impair personal choice (sometimes in this debate called autonomy) – mental capacity in decision making, and lack of coercion. The presence of subtle or implicit coercion can be hard to detect.

How will coercion be assessed? For example, who else other than the candidate will be interviewed?

However, personal choice for one person may lead to risk for others – drink-driving, smoking in public places for example. Many of the leading risks for wanting to end life in the presence of physical illness are social – loneliness, living alone, low income and lack of employment, and a lack of social support. A history of problems with alcohol or drugs is also common. So is a history of mental health problems – typically not psychotic illness but recurrent episodes of depression. Suicide in the face of these risks is a result of a powerless feeling there are no other options. Identifying these risks requires an extended and sensitive exploration of social and personal circumstances; simply establishing mental competence and a lack of coercion won’t do. What assisted dying legislation does is create the framework of practice that puts vulnerable people at risk.

How will vulnerability factors be assessed? Will it be a requirement to consult a next-of-kin? Will it be a requirement to consult the individual’s usual general practitioner or other clinician familiar with their condition?

Q4 What legal safeguards will be in place?

Assisted dying legislation aims to exempt healthcare professionals from prosecution for assisting suicide. This leaves a question about assisting suicide when it is undertaken by somebody else – a spouse for example. It is this sort of scenario that has led PM Keir Starmer to suggest that decriminalising assisted suicide will be compassionate.

Will exemption extend to anybody who assists the suicide of somebody with an eligible clinical condition? Or will it be decriminalised only if the assisting person is a clinician approved for the purpose?

McArthur’s assisted dying (Scotland) bill recommends legalising the issue of a false death certificate

Conflict arises when family members do not agree with the assisted suicide of their relative, about which they may not have been consulted until after the event. Legislation has been drafted to protect clinicians from legal action in this situation, for example by allowing the issue of a false death certificate that names the cause of death as the eligible medical condition or by specifically proscribing civil action. 

Are protections against legal action a part of proposed practice and if so exactly what are they? Do they limit the reasonable rights of interested others?

Q5 How will adverse events be monitored and responded to?

There are two main types of adverse event: so-called protocol violations and unintended problems or complications. Protocol violations involve deviation from the practice laid down in legislation – the individual does not meet eligibility criteria, or the prescribed assessment process is not followed for example. Unintended problems include those listed above – emergence of intolerable symptoms or greatly-extended time to death for example.

How will adverse events be monitored in a way that ensures rapid and effective oversight?

All healthcare systems and procedures (vaccination programmes, surgical procedures and so on) have an adverse event rate. In fact all human endeavours do – including running nuclear power stations or flying passenger planes. Adverse event rates are used to determine stopping rules – the point at which the rate of negative outcomes outweighs the benefits. Stopping rules might include withdrawing a certain drug from use or closing a hospital unit because of poor outcomes.

How will adverse events be responded to and what are the specified stopping rules for an assisted dying programme?

You won’t find the answers to all these questions in either the McArthur or the Falconer bills. Why should you? After all, it’s just about personal choice.  Isn’t it?

  • November 29, 2023

Marketing medical assistance in dying and the privileging of personal choice

One of the defining features of a functioning state is usually taken to be that the state holds a monopoly of violence – especially violence towards its own citizens. There are however a number of situations in which the state sanctions killing, or at least does not punish it. Putting aside the activities of the armed forces and police, the other common situations fall under the umbrella of what might (surprisingly) be thought of as the public health. They include, in jurisdictions where they are allowed (not criminalised): termination of pregnancy, suicide and euthanasia.

I discern a number of influences at play when decisions are being made about the exact circumstances under which the state will allow ending of life. There may be others, but as a starter my list is:

  • The degree to which the life under consideration is regarded, by the person living it, as so burdensome as to no longer be worth living;
  • The social value of the life under consideration – that is, how others view the individual per se or as a result of any condition from which they suffer;
  • The practical, technical or emotional difficulties inherent in the process of ending the life – what we might call barriers to implementation;
  • The degree to which differences of opinion have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a final decision.

These sorts of ideas are encapsulated in enabling legislation, of course each being given different weight according to the exact circumstances.

I was recently listening to a talk about medical assistance in dying (MAID) given by the historian Kevin Yuill during a meeting in Jersey. Yuill introduced me to another angle on this, which is thinking about the motivational influences: not how the decision is made but something like why it is being made at all. Yuill suggests that in the history of euthanasia and assisted suicide, the main motivating factors have been ideas about utility and compassion. Utility has featured most brutally in pro-euthanasia and eugenicist ideas about ballast existence and while compassion could be instrumentalised in support of these endeavours, it also has a more altruistic side. More recently however, an appeal to autonomy has come to dominate: euthanasia and suicide (assisted or not) are argued to be, in the right circumstances, individual choices which should not be blocked by authoritarian government actions.

This proposition struck a chord – when I speak with friends and colleagues about MAID, the response of those who support it is that it is a personal choice that they would like to be able to make for themselves if they were in a position where it was relevant. If they have thought further, it is only to consider briefly (and dismiss as avoidable) the slippery slope argument.

And the appeal to autonomy describes neatly how the campaign for medical assistance in dying (which in the UK means physician-assisted suicide) is being framed. What is going on in the public debate about MAID legislation is not that supporters are contributing to a dispassionate assessment of the pros and cons of a momentous change in the law – with potential direct and indirect harms being considered as well as potential individual benefits. Instead the idea is promoted (marketed) that MAID is evidently something people will want to choose and that preventing that choice is wrong. The emotive case histories/horror stories, celebrity endorsement and misrepresentation of the alternatives as the quiet dignity of assisted suicide versus giving oneself up to the horrors of end-of-life or palliative care, are all designed to arouse anger about a right denied.

When the exercise of personal choice becomes the paramount consideration we are in a society where the individual’s wishes overshadow questions of the public good. Now how could that not strike a chord…

  • February 8, 2023

Medical assistance in dying is another name for physician assisted suicide

The rebranding should not blind us to the risks involved.

The argument for what is now called ‘assisted dying’ is often framed in terms of personal autonomy – the right to choose the time and mode of one’s death.

Individuals included in media reports as pressing for that right are typically mentally competent, educated, and supported by a partner or family member who affirms their desire to die. Campaigners pressing for change suggest (at times in strikingly gothic terms) that if their wishes are denied, the likely alternative is a difficult death during which pain is inadequately treated and distressing symptoms are mismanaged. ‘Assisted dying’ is thereby positioned as a form of patient-centred care – a death with ‘dignity’.

Put like this, the case can seem incontrovertible. Who wouldn’t want a ‘dignified death’ in which their own wishes were central to any decisions about their treatment? But this is a narrow and unbalanced way of framing the discussion; it fails to communicate the full range of questions that arise when thinking about serious illness. “Assisted dying’ is a euphemism for physician assisted suicide; it involves prescribing lethal drugs to somebody who will then self-administer them to end their life. Framing the practice like this gives a different perspective that is masked by the rebadging as assisted dying. What we know about suicide more widely becomes relevant in informing what we think about doctor-assisted suicide.

People living with severe, persistent physical illness can of course feel that their condition is intolerable. Indeed, research shows that about one in ten describe having thoughts that their life is not worth living, or that they might be better off dead. And suicide rates in people with a severe health condition are double those of the general population.  Even so, recent data from the Office for National Statistics suggest that in absolute terms fewer than 10% of suicides are in people with a severe health condition. Some of the study findings come as a surprise; for example of 17,195 suicides identified from 2014-2017, only 58 (0.3%) were in people with what the study called low survival cancer. This is about three times the general population suicide rate but accounts for only 3 in every 10,000 of those recorded as having low survival cancer in the study period. In other words the great majority of people (more than 99%) with negative thoughts about their circumstances do not take their own lives.

What does research into suicide in the wider population suggest might make suicide more likely? Many of the leading risks are social – loneliness, living alone, low income and lack of employment, and a lack of social support. A history of problems with alcohol or drugs is also common, especially in men. So is a history of mental health problems – typically not psychotic illness but recurrent episodes of depression. More than half of those who take their own lives have a history of previous self-harm. These risks are also prominent when suicide occurs in the setting of severe physical illness, even among those who are simultaneously in contact with mental health services.

Suicide associated with severe physical illness occurs most commonly in the first year after diagnosis, especially in the first six months. This observation is in line with research showing that rather than intolerable and untreatable symptoms it is concerns about the future and loss of independence that motivate many requests for physician-assisted suicide.

US psychologist Thomas Joiner has outlined an influential interpersonal theory of suicide that makes much sense of these findings. He outlines three risks for suicide – thwarted belongingness (closely-related to the idea of lack of social connectedness), perceived burdensomeness, and acquired capability (overcoming the fear of death). Thinking about suicide in this way helps us to be clearer about the nature of suicide in the physically ill and therefore ‘assisted dying’, which is a risk for exactly those people whose suicide we are used to working to prevent, by actively helping people to “acquire capability”.

The response to these concerns rests upon assurances that only carefully selected cases will be accepted into a programme of assisted suicide. We can have no confidence that such “safeguards” will be adhered to.  For example in one study from the Netherlands, 12% of those accepted failed to meet the criterion of there being no alternatives for palliative treatment and 7% were not reported has experiencing unbearable suffering. I have yet to see a statement from supporters of medical assistance in dying about their opinion on what is an acceptable error rate in the system.

There is another reason for concern about doctor-assisted suicide – less tangible perhaps but with far-reaching consequences. It fundamentally changes our approach to suicide, Under the Suicide Act 1961 an act “intended to encourage or assist suicide” is a criminal offence. There are no exclusions – it is an all-encompassing approach that is reflected in our National Suicide Prevention Strategy. What is proposed is a radical overhaul of the way we approach suicide – a move away from trying to prevent all instances to a world in which we attempt to prevent suicide except when we decide to make it easier.

We are facing in medical assistance in dying a privileging of personal preference over social concern. It represents not just a modification of individual clinical practice but a societal intervention designed to change how we think about and respond to suicidal wishes. I find it hard to believe that the longer-term consequences, intended or otherwise, will be of universal benefit to those most in need of our care.

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